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ABSTRACT 
 
Turland, Madeline G. M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, July 2018. Farmers’ 
willingness to participate in a big data sharing program: A study of Saskatchewan grain farmers 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Peter Slade 
 
Big data in crop agriculture is information collected by sophisticated machinery at the farm level, 
as well as externally generated data, such as field satellite imagery. Although some of this data is 
useful to individual farmers, much of it has little value to the farmer that collects it. Capturing the 
true value of big data comes when it is aggregated over many farms, allowing researchers to find 
underlying bio-physical and economical relationships.  
We conduct a hypothetical choice experiment to analyze farmers’ willingness to share data 
by asking farmers in Saskatchewan whether they would participate in a big data sharing program. 
The choice tasks varied the type of organization that operated the big data program and included 
financial and non-financial incentives.  
Heteroscedastic and random effects probit models are presented using the data from the 
survey. The results are consistent across models and find that farmers are most willing to share 
their data with university researchers, followed by crop input suppliers or grower associations, and 
financial institutions or equipment manufacturers. Farmers are least willing to share their data with 
government. Farmers are more willing to share data in the presence of a financial incentive or non-
financial incentive such as comparative benchmark statistics or prescription maps generated from 
the data submitted.  
Checks for robustness and heterogeneity indicate there is no self-selection bias into the 
survey, and no heterogeneity in the results for financial incentive and farm revenue. A latent class 
logit model determines the farmer population may be heterogenous in their willingness to 
participate in a big data sharing program, but homogenous in their ordering of preferences for 
organization, financial incentive, and non-financial incentive. In addition, demographic variables 
are not related to class membership.  
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLDEGMENTS 
 I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Slade. This 
thesis is a testament to the countless hours I spent in his office, and the many more he spent reading 
my (often crude) writing. Peter encouraged me to attend conferences and present my work when I 
had the opportunity. His guidance, support, and mentorship through this process was invaluable to 
my success. I hope many more students will have the privilege to study under him. I would also 
like to thank my committee members Dr. Richard Gray, Dr. Eric Micheels, and Dr. Stuart Smyth 
for their valuable contributions and timely feedback.  
A special thanks goes to my parents, Robert Turland and Eve Geisler, for their support 
through this process, and for the help and guidance they have given me through my life. Their life 
lessons and encouragement made this process much easier. I would also like to thank my partner, 
Devin Serfas, who believed in me through this entire process. His emotional support gave me the 
determination to keep working, and the time he spent reading and editing improved the quality of 
my work.   
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Permission to Use ............................................................................................................................ i 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................v 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 
Background ......................................................................................................................................4 
Data ................................................................................................................................................10 
Method ...........................................................................................................................................17 
Results ............................................................................................................................................20 
Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................................................36 
References ......................................................................................................................................39 
Appendix 1: Full Results Tables  ...................................................................................................42  
Appendix 2: Model Choice and Construction  ..............................................................................60  
  
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Organizations and incentives studied ..............................................................................10 
Table 2: Responses to attitude questions set (respondents rate their level of agreement on a scale 
from one to five) ............................................................................................................................13 
Table 3: Proportion of Saskatchewan farms by revenue range......................................................15 
Table 4: Analysis sample construction ..........................................................................................15 
Table 5: Marginal Effects for heteroscedastic probit and random effects probit models ..............20 
Table 6: Marginal effects with interaction terms between farm revenue and financial incentive 
included ..........................................................................................................................................26 
Table 7: Marginal effects for factors generated by factor analysis ................................................28 
Table 8: Wald test results for quartile analysis ..............................................................................30 
Table 9: Comparison of means between Q1 and Q4 for attitude variables ...................................30 
Table 10: BIC for different numbers of classes and Z ...................................................................31 
Table 11: Coefficients and standard errors for three class model, socio-demographics in the 
membership equation (𝑍ଶ௜) ............................................................................................................32 
Table 12: Overall partial effects for latent class logit, socio-demographic indicators in the 
membership equation (𝑍ଶ௜) ............................................................................................................34 
Table 13: Coefficients impacting class membership (base = class 3), socio-demographic indicators 
included in the membership equation (𝑍ଶ௜) ...................................................................................35 
Table A1.1: Specification 1: Control Variables  ............................................................................39 
Table A1.2: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for base model heteroscedastic probit
........................................................................................................................................................41 
Table A1.3: Specification 2: Interaction terms between financial incentive and revenue range  ..42 
Table A1.4: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for heteroscedastic probit with 
interaction terms between revenue and financial incentive  ..........................................................45 
Table A1.5: Specification 3: Factor Analysis  ...............................................................................46 
Table A1.6: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for heteroscedastic probit with factor 
analysis for attitude variables ........................................................................................................48 
Table A1.7: Marginal Effects for Quartile Analysis; Heteroscedastic Probit  ..............................49 
Table A1.8: Marginal Effects for Quartile Analysis; Random Effects Probit  ..............................50 
Table A1.9: Latent class logit coefficients, no variables in the membership equation (𝑍ଵ௜) .........51 
vi 
 
Table A1.10: Latent class overall partial effects, no variables in the membership equation (𝑍ଵ௜) 51 
Table A1.11: Latent class logit coefficients, attitude statements in the membership equation (𝑍ଷ௜)
........................................................................................................................................................52 
Table A1.12: Coefficients impacting class membership, attitude statements in the membership 
equation (𝑍ଷ௜), base = class 3 .........................................................................................................53 
Table A1.13: Latent class overall partial effects, attitude statements in the membership equation 
(𝑍ଷ௜) ................................................................................................................................................53 
Table A1.14: Latent class logit coefficients, technology use variables in the membership 
equation (𝑍ସ௜) .................................................................................................................................54 
Table A1.15: Coefficients impacting class membership, technology use variables in the 
membership equation (𝑍ସ௜), base = class 3 ....................................................................................55 
Table A1.16: Latent class overall partial effects, technology use in the membership equation 
(𝑍ସ௜) ................................................................................................................................................56 
Table A2.1: Correlation matrix for attitude variables  ...................................................................59 
Table A2.2: Proportion of variation explained by generated factors  ............................................60 
Table A2.3: Eigenvectors for first factor for each group  ..............................................................61 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Example question from the choice question set .............................................................11 
Figure 2: Information script preceding choice question set ...........................................................12 
Figure 3: Responses to technology use question set ......................................................................14 
Figure 4: Big data program participation rates for select subsamples ...........................................16 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern precision agricultural technologies have the ability to generate detailed farm and field 
level datasets, mapping inputs and outputs to the sub-field level, for large crop operations. This 
data is not only useful to farmers but has the potential to transform technological innovation and 
production in the agriculture industry. This type of data is a subset of what is commonly referred 
to as big data. Historically, big data is defined as datasets so large they cannot be processed by 
traditional software (Cox and Ellsworth, 1997). However, that definition has evolved and the term 
“big data” now has many interpretations. Commonly, big data is described by three Vs; volume, 
velocity, and variety. In this thesis, I focus on data generated by precision agriculture equipment 
on crop operations in Saskatchewan. Across farms, this type of data rarely differs in velocity or 
variety, but by aggregating it over many farms, the volume can be greatly increased.  
Big data is used in almost every industry, and researchers are finding ever more innovative 
ways of extracting value from it. However, in crop agriculture, much of the value of big data is 
being left on the table (or in the field). Regional analysis is rarely performed because farm level 
big data is seldom aggregated (Poppe, Wolfert, Verdouw, and Renwick, 2015). A dataset 
aggregated over many farms becomes valuable for researchers attempting to uncover underlying 
bio-physical and economical relationships that could help generate improvements in yield, 
environmental stewardship, automation, other areas related to agricultural production, and where 
research dollars should be spent in the future.  
Ownership of big data in agriculture is a murky question. Some argue that the companies 
that make the equipment that captures the data (such as John Deere) have some legal claim to the 
data, while others say that producers retain full ownership (Sykuta, 2016). When farmers purchase 
equipment, they receive an implied license for the life of the vehicle to operate the vehicle, but the 
copyright for the software that runs the equipment remains with the manufacturer (Lyseng, 2018; 
Schemper, 2014; Wiens, 2015). It is unclear where the generated data lies on the spectrum from 
farmer ownership to manufacturer ownership. One way to aggregate farm level data is to set up a 
big data sharing program, and have farmers voluntarily participate. Achieving high participation 
rates is a primary goal when constructing a big data program because the value of the big data 
sharing program increases with the number of farmers participating as a result of network 
externalities. However, if farmers place a high value on privacy, they may be reluctant to share 
information about themselves and getting them to voluntarily participate could be difficult. This 
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thesis estimates farmers’ willingness to share big data, who they are willing to share it with, and 
what can incentivize them to do so.  
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the key factors that influence grain farmers’ 
willingness to participate in a big data program in Saskatchewan. I conducted a survey of grain 
farmers in Saskatchewan, asking a series of hypothetical choice questions. Survey respondents 
were asked if they would participate in a big data program under varying conditions. The choice 
questions varied; (a) the organization running the program, (b) the financial incentive for 
participation, and (c) the non-financial incentive for participation. The specifics of the survey are 
detailed in the data section of this thesis. A heteroscedastic probit model and a random effects 
probit model are estimated. A latent class model is also presented to check for heterogeneity in the 
results.   
The results are consistent across models. The institution responsible for coordinating the 
big data program has a particularly important effect on participation rates. Farmers are most willing 
to join a program run by university researchers, followed by crop input suppliers or grower 
associations, then equipment manufacturers or financial institutions. Farmers are least willing to 
participate in a program run by government. Positive financial incentives increase farmer 
participation rates, while monetary contributions for participation (negative financial incentives) 
have no impact on participation rates. The financial incentives studied are small compared to farm 
revenue, supporting the existence of a privacy paradox. Non-financial incentives, such as 
benchmark statistics or prescription maps generated from data submitted, increases farmers’ 
willingness to share data, but less so than financial incentives.  
There has been no previous work analyzing farmers’ willingness to share data, although 
some work has been done measuring privacy behaviours in the general population. Privacy 
preferences do not appear to change after the individual has received education about privacy 
policies and potential risks (Olsen, Grundin, and Horvits, 2005; Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, and 
Hughes, 2009). If this holds true for farmers, then they will not be induced to share data through 
social coercion methods such as advertising campaigns. Other methods, such as financial or non-
financial incentives for participation, must be used.  
Often, people will state strong privacy preferences, but appear to violate these preferences 
for remarkably small rewards. This is known as the privacy paradox (Athey, Catalini, and Tucker, 
2017; Norberg, Horne, and Horne, 2007; Barnes, 2006). This paradox is clearly demonstrated by 
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Athey, Catalini, and Tucker (2017). In the paper, students at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) were induced to violate their stated privacy preferences for a slice of pizza. 
Relative to their actions, people tend to overstate their privacy preferences when directly asked. 
The privacy paradox could inform the results of this thesis; the incentives required to induce 
farmers to participate in a big data program may be surprisingly small.  
 This thesis adds to the body of work surrounding privacy and big data by analyzing farmers 
in Saskatchewan. This research provides a foundation for the construction of a big data sharing 
program for agriculture in the future. Understanding what organization would be most successful 
in establishing a big data program, and the effect of different incentives on participation rates will 
make the construction of the program more likely, and less costly. Future gains in productivity and 
efficiency in agriculture might be data driven, as most of the low hanging productivity gains have 
already been realized. Canadian agriculture must be willing to innovate to keep pace with a 
growing world population. A big data program allows researchers to do just that.   
The first section below is further background surrounding issues related to big data and 
data management in agriculture. Section three outlines the survey, and data used for the statistical 
analysis. Section four presents the methods used. Section five shows the results, and section six 
presents a discussion and conclusion. Appendices 1 and 2 present full results tables, and a more 
detailed discussion of the method.   
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BACKGROUND 
Big data is an abstract concept with many fluid definitions. The first use of the term big data was 
by Cox and Ellsworth (1997), who defined a dataset as “big” if it was too large to be processed by 
traditional software. Since that time the definition of big data has evolved to include many types 
of data that are “big” in different ways. George, Haas, and Pentland (2014) suggest that the fine-
grained nature of the data defines big data; it does not matter how many individuals are in the 
dataset, but rather how much you know about each individual. Cukier and Mayer-Schoenbergen 
(2013) argue that big data is about learning things from a large body of information that was 
invisible in a smaller set. Trujillo, Kim, Jones, Garcia, and Murray (2015) describe the three V’s 
of big data: volume, velocity, and variety. These characteristics reveal the challenges of collecting 
and working with big data; large amounts of everchanging data, requiring real time collection and 
analysis.  
 Until recently, the cost of data storage was so high that collecting and using big data was 
prohibitively costly in most situations. With falling costs of storage and analysis, big data is 
becoming a more widely used tool. Private companies are seeing the benefits of investing in data 
and competing to be the first in their industries to innovate. As the cost of data storage continues 
to fall, big data will become an ever more accessible tool for industry and government (Trujillo et 
al, 2015).  
Working with big data brings challenges for researchers. The sheer number of observations 
in the dataset could make identifying important relationships difficult (George, Haas, and Pentland, 
2014; Fan, Han, and Liu, 2014). Working with many observations means standard errors for any 
analysis will be low, and almost any relationship could be found to be statistically significant, 
when in fact no causal relationship exists. Researchers are faced with the prospect of sorting 
through large numbers of statistically significant relationships to determine the economically 
significant ones. In addition, there is a danger of overfitting models because of the sheer number 
of available variables (Fan, Han, & Liu, 2014). Data quality may be lower in big datasets as it 
becomes increasingly difficult to clean and curate data as the datasets increase in size. This should 
not be a significant problem however if there is at least some accuracy in the data. Some 
inaccuracies can be tolerated in exchange for the benefits that come with such large datasets 
(Cukier and Schoenbergen, 2013). Big data holds the potential to uncover population patterns and 
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heterogeneities that are unexpected, and subtle relationships that cannot be found with 
conventional data. 
 In crop agriculture, big data describes datasets created by sophisticated machinery and 
software that quantify inputs and outputs at a micro level. Other types of data not generated by 
farm equipment such as satellite imagery are also included in big data. Big data is part of the 
precision agriculture revolution that aims to increase automation and productivity. Precision 
agriculture is the application of technologies to manage spatial and temporal variability associated 
with all aspects of agriculture production (Pierce and Nowak, 1999). Big data informs precision 
agriculture by providing the farmer with detailed information about their land and input use, 
allowing farmers to make better decisions and use their precision agriculture equipment more 
efficiently. An example of big data use in agriculture is mapping profits on a field in terms of input 
use and yield and converting areas of the field that consistently show negative profits to 
conservation (Coble, 2018). Other examples include benchmarking, sensor deployment and 
analytics, and predictive modelling (Wolfert, Ge, Verdouw, and Bogaardt, 2017). Big data can 
also be used to measure environmental degradation. Big data applications in farming are not 
strictly about primary production but play a major role in improving the efficiency of the entire 
supply chain and alleviating food security concerns (Wolfert, Ge, Verdouw, and Bogaardt, 2017).  
 Whatever the promised benefits, advances using precision agriculture and big data may be 
insignificant when it comes to increased production, as weather continues to be the most important 
factor. The benefits of big data and precision agriculture might be oversold to farmers, as many 
precision agriculture techniques have yet to be proven, and it is uncertain whether their promised 
benefits will ever be realized (Bronson and Knezevic, 2016). However, farmers must percieve at 
least some benefits from the use of precision agriculture techniques as the use of this technology 
is rising. In the experimental choice survey conducted for this study, 75% of respondents use yield 
monitors, 94% use GPS guidance, 77% use soil sampling, 29% use variable rate technology, and 
56% use automatic section control. 
In 1996, Steven Sonka and Karen Coaldrake considered what precision agriculture and 
advanced communication technologies would mean for farms. They imagined the possibility of a 
“Cyberfarm” (Sonka & Coaldrake, 1996). These operations would be capable of capturing and 
analyzing farm level data. They imagined a network of farmers sharing information using 
advanced communication technology. Although not all elements of the Cyberfarm have been 
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realized, significant advancements have been made in communications, information sharing, and 
marketing. However, there remain challenges facing big data in agriculture. Currently, farm data 
is rarely shared, analyzed by intelligent software, or combined for regional analysis (Poppe, 
Wolfert, Verdouw, and Renwick, 2015). For the industry to be revolutionized, seamless data 
integration systems that farmers believe in must be put in place. The eventual impact of big data 
within the agricultural sector likely will require both organizational and technological innovation 
(Sonka, 2014).  
It is unclear where the benefits of big data in agriculture will flow, however Sonka (2016) 
determines that consumers will be the ultimate beneficiaries as technological advancements tend 
to lower prices for consumers. In contrast, Bronsen and Knezevic (2016) predict that most of the 
benefits from big data will flow to a small number of large agriculture companies. This is a direct 
result of the oligopolistic nature of the agriculture industry. A small number of large firms control 
input supply to a large number of small farmers. Farmers could also see some benefits from big 
data use depending on how the big data market is ultimately structured. The reality is that many 
of the benefits that come from using big data and the distribution of those benefits remain 
unknown. Researchers do not yet know what they will be able to accomplish using big data in 
agriculture. The advances can  not come if the data is unavailable, so the construction of a big data 
sharing program is the first step to big data research in agriculture.  
There has been little work studying farmers perceptions of big data. Boyer, Engleking, and 
Gudas (2015) find that farmers have a positive view of big data, yet also value traditional farm 
management tools over more advanced technologies. Their study found that few participants 
indicated high awareness of data security and other risks, and increased concern about data security 
was not associated with age or education. Farmers’ perceptions of big data are informed by the 
marketing tactics employed by companies that sell big data services.  
Big data technologies use information collected by precision agriculture technologies. It 
follows that the adoption path of big data technologies will be similar to that of precision 
agriculture technologies. The adoption of precision agriculture technologies has been slower than 
predicted, but some producer characteristics have been linked to higher rates of adoption. Farm 
size is positively correlated with adoption, while age is negatively correlated (Tamirat, Pedersen, 
and Lind, 2018; Deberkow and McBride, 2003; Larson et al., 2008). In addition, computational 
literacy and education are positively correlated with the decision to adopt (Deberkow and 
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McBride, 2003; Larson et al., 2008). Looking at the non-agriculture private sector, factors 
affecting a firm’s willingness to adopt big data technologies include the firm’s human resources, 
technology resources, and management support (Sun, Cegeilski, Jia, and Hall, 2018).  
Adoption of technologies not only depends on the individual considering adoption, but on 
the characteristics of the technology itself. Technologies that require the farmer to acquire 
additional knowledge to operate (such as variable rate technology) have lower adoption rates than 
those that can be integrated using existing knowledge (such as GPS guidance) (Miller, Griffin, 
Bergtold, Ciampitti, and Sharda, 2017). Firms in all sectors are more willing to adopt if the 
perceived benefits from the technology are high, and the cost of adoption is low (Sun, Cegeilski, 
Jia, and Hall, 2018). As the availability and variety of hardware and software needed to collect and 
analyze big data increases, farmers will be more willing to adopt, and there will be increased public 
sector initiatives and business ventures in the agricultural sector (Kamilaris, Kartakoullis, and 
Prenafeta-Boldú, 2017).  
Farmer participation in a big data sharing program is akin to adopting a new technology 
and depends on the value the farmer will extract from participation. As a big data sharing program 
becomes larger, it not only becomes more valuable, but it also becomes more widely known among 
farmers. Products that gain value from a large userbase benefit from network externalities (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985). Being first to the market could bring advantages in terms of establishing a 
loyal following among farmers, and an environment that lacks competition for market share. 
However, those that choose to enter the market later can observe and learn from the first-to-
market’s model and develop a better product. Product compatibility also becomes relevant when 
considering competition between database companies. The ease with which consumers can switch 
between companies will undoubtedly affect the market structure of data collection in agriculture 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1986). Perhaps there is a role for government to ensure compatibility between 
systems, allowing for competition in the marketplace.  
The organization that ultimately invests in the construction of a big data program will 
determine the structure of the database within the constraints (if any) the government has provided, 
including who have access to the data, and how the data will be used. Bronson and Knezevic 
(2016) say “the use of large information sets and the digital tools for collecting, aggregating, and 
analyzing them … has the potential to wade in on long-standing relationships between players in 
food and agriculture.” 
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There has been no previous work analyzing farmers’ willingness to share data, although 
some work has been done measuring privacy behaviours in the general population. Privacy 
preferences are found to be fixed for individuals and do not change when individuals are educated 
about data sharing risks or the absence of risks (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, and Hughes, 2009; Olsen, 
Grundin, and Horvitz, 2005). These studies apply to personal data of people in the general 
population. Farmers’ privacy preferences may be different than the general population, and farm 
data is business data rather than personal data. However, most farms are family run, and the 
business data is confounded with personal data making a clear separation between the two difficult. 
It is unknown whether farmers’ treat their farm data as personal or business, and if that has any 
impact on data sharing preferences.  
Relative to their actions, people tend to overstate their privacy preferences when directly 
asked. This is known as a privacy paradox (Norberg, Horne, and Horne, 2007; Barnes, 2006). An 
example of the privacy paradox is found in Athey, Catalini, and Tucker (2017). Students surveyed 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) were found to relinquish data quite readily 
when incentivized to do so, even though their stated privacy preference may be strong. The privacy 
paradox highlights the importance of experiments in privacy research, as surveys may not 
adequately capture privacy preferences. Evidence of this privacy paradox is found in the results of 
this thesis, however, this thesis is based on data collected through a survey, and so the results are 
still subject to a hypothetical bias.  
Pavolotsky (2013) identifies a unique problem with sharing big data. The value of big data 
may lie in identifying secondary uses of the data that are unimagined at the time of collection. 
When consent to share data is obtained, it applies only to those uses of the data that are conceivable. 
Keeping and using data for unimagined purposes stretches the limits of meaningful consent. This 
is illustrated in the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal that broke in early 2018. The Facebook 
profile data of up to 87 million users was collected and sold to Cambridge Analytica (Bloomberg, 
2018). Cambridge Analytica then used the data to target voters with hyper-specific appeals, 
potentially having an impact on election results. Before the scandal broke, Facebook users would 
have been unaware that their data may have been used to influence election results. Perhaps they 
would have chosen to update their privacy settings to keep their information private had they been 
aware.  
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In agriculture, there are many stakeholders that see the value in constructing a big data 
program that encompasses data from many farms. Government has vested interests in greater 
agricultural production and higher farm incomes. University researchers want to expand the type 
of research they are able to undertake and conduct current research more accurately. Equipment 
manufacturers and crop input suppliers are continually attempting to innovate new products and 
improve services for farmers. Financial institutions want detailed information on a farmer’s 
operation, so they can better evaluate their ability to repay loans. Grower organizations are looking 
for better ways to serve their industries. Each of these organizations could conceivably decide to 
pioneer a big data sharing program as all would see benefits. This research attempts to determine 
which organization would generate the highest participation rates among farmers, and what 
incentives are most effective in inducing them to do so.  
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DATA 
The data come from a hypothetical choice experiment. The survey was administered online by 
Kynetec, a market survey company, to grain farmers in Saskatchewan from October 10 to 
November 20, 2017. Respondents were offered $10 in compensation for completing the survey. 
Due to lower than normal response rates, compensation was raised to $20 on November 1, and to 
$30 on November 8. Out of 561 respondents, 344 were compensated with $10, 129 were 
compensated with $20, and 88 were compensated with $30. Payments are controlled for in the 
analysis, and do not have a statistically significant impact on the results.  
 The survey asked farmers about their use of precision agriculture technology, attitudes 
towards privacy, technology use and farm management, and sociodemographic information. In 
addition, respondents were asked a series of choice questions. The choice questions asked if 
respondents would be willing to participate in a big data program under specific conditions.  
The choice questions presented a set of scenarios that varied; (a) the organization running 
the big data program, (b) the financial incentive for participation, and (c) the non-financial 
incentive for participation. Table 1 shows the organizations and incentives that were included. One 
option from each category was chosen to formulate each choice question, and each respondent was 
asked to evaluate twelve separate choice questions. A screenshot showing an example choice 
question is presented in figure 1. Preceding the choice question set, the respondents were provided 
with an information script briefly explaining the rationale behind a big data program. The script 
also asks respondents to assume no transaction costs for program participation. A screenshot of 
this is shown in figure 2.  
Table 1: Organizations and incentives studied 
Organization Financial Incentive Non-Financial Incentive 
1. University Researchers 1. -$50 1. None 
2. Crop Input Suppliers  2. $0 2. Prescription maps based on the data 
submitted. Depending on the data submitted 
these could be for fertilizer, seed, fungicide, or 
other inputs. 
3. Grower Associations 3. $50 
4. Equipment Manufacturers 4. $100 
5. Financial Institutions  3. Yield and input use benchmarks. For 
example, “of the farms in your area, your 
yields are in the 50th percentile while your 
fertilizer use is in the 75th.” 
6. Government  
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Figure 1: Example question from the choice question set  
 
Screenshot from the online survey conducted by Kynetec. 
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Figure 2: Information script preceding choice question set 
 
Screenshot from the online survey conducted by Kynetec.  
 
The survey design was pseudo-random. With the options studied, there are seventy-two 
unique combinations of organization, financial incentive, and non-financial incentive. The 
seventy-two unique scenarios were divided into six groups of twelve, ensuring sufficient variation 
in organization, financial incentive, and non-financial incentive within each group. Six versions of 
the survey were created, each asking one of these groups of twelve questions. Each respondent 
randomly received a version of the survey to answer. An approximately equal number of responses 
was received for each version of the survey.  
 In addition, respondents were asked to evaluate eleven statements by their level of 
agreement on a scale of one (low level of agreement) to five (high level of agreement). These 
statements attempt to capture farmers’ attitudes towards privacy, technology use, and farm 
management. The first three statements measure privacy attitudes, the following four statements 
measure technology use attitudes, and the final four statements measure farm management 
attitudes. Since multiple statements are attempting to capture the same thing, we would expect the 
results within each subset of questions to be highly correlated. The statements, their mean 
responses, and standard deviations are shown in table 2. These questions are referred to as the 
attitude question set in this thesis.   
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Table 2: Responses to attitude questions set (respondents rate their level of agreement on a 
scale from one to five) 
  Mean St. Dev. 
Privacy   
Privacy is important to me 4.0 1.00 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm 3.1 1.10 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 3.2 0.95 
   
Technology use   
I like to have the latest technology 3.4 1.00 
I find new technologies easy to use 3.3 0.99 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth 2.5 1.02 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 3.3 1.04 
   
Farm management   
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 3.6 0.87 
I am proactive in seeking advice 3.9 0.85 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 4.0 0.97 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm 3.6 0.89 
 
To gauge farmers’ current use of modern technology, respondents were asked about their 
use of yield monitors, Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance, soil sampling, variable rate 
technology, and automatic section control. Respondents answered, “I do not use this technology”, 
“I use this technology and it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance”, or “I use this technology 
and it improves my farm’s performance”. The responses to these questions are detailed in figure 
3. GPS guidance is the most widely adopted technology, while the fewest number of farmers have 
adopted variable rate technology. Yield monitors are highly adopted, however 44% of farmers who 
have adopted them say their farm performance hasn’t improved as a result. These questions are 
referred to as the technology use question set in this thesis. 
 The five technologies studied in this thesis are all precision agriculture technologies, 
however not all of them utilize big data in a meaningful way. GPS guidance and automatic section 
control are mechanical technologies that don’t require outside analysis for decision making. 
However, they are complementary to big data technologies as they must be adopted for big data 
technologies to be effective. Yield monitors and variable rate technology generate big data, and 
require outside analysis to be done for value to be extracted from their use. The survey asks 
questions about all of these technologies as the responses could indicate the speed at which a 
farmer adopts new technology.   
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Figure 3: Responses to technology use question set 
 
 
The average age of those surveyed was 56.1 (standard deviation of 11.0). This is similar to 
the average age of farm operators in Saskatchewan in 2016, which was 55 years (CANSIM table 
004-0017). Women are underrepresented in the survey; they make up just 5.5% of respondents 
while 24.9% of farm operators in Saskatchewan were female in 2016 (CANSIM table 004-0017). 
Of those surveyed, 5% did not have a high school diploma, while 23% had a university degree. In 
contrast, only 7.2% of farmers in Saskatchewan had a university degree in 2011 (CANSIM table 
004-0110). In the survey, 58% of farms were incorporated, 51% used the services of an 
agronomist, and 26% used the services of a financial analyst.  
Annual sales revenue was collected as a categorical variable. A comparison of survey data 
and data collected from Statistics Canada can be found in table 3. Of those surveyed, 3% reported 
annual sales revenues less than $100,000, 29% reported revenue between $100,000 and $499,999, 
27% reported revenues between $500,000 and $1 million, 20% reported revenues between $1 
million and $2 million, 4% reported revenues between $2 million and $3 million, and 5% reported 
revenues greater than $3 million. A significant portion (12%) of respondents refused to disclose 
their annual sales revenue. This distribution differs from that found by Statistics Canada (CANSIM 
table 004-0006). This discrepancy might be partially explained by differences in the farm 
population surveyed. Statistics Canada includes all farmers in their measure, including livestock, 
specialty crop, and hobby farms. These farms tend to be smaller and generate less revenue, skewing 
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the distribution downward. In contrast, the survey conducted for this study included only grain 
farmers in Saskatchewan. In addition, the pool of farmers that Kynetec samples from is skewed 
towards larger operations.  
Table 3: Proportion of Saskatchewan farms by revenue range  
Revenue Range 
Survey  
(grain farmers in SK) 
Statistics Canada*  
(All farmers in SK) 
<$100,000 3% 43% 
$100,000-$499,999 29% 35% 
$500,000-$999,999 27% 12% 
$1 million - $2 million 20% 7% 
$2 million - $3 million 4% 
3%** 
>$3 million 5% 
* CANSIM table 004-0006 
**The final two categories are combined in StatCan data 
 
The survey resulted in a panel dataset. Each respondent answered twelve choice questions, 
which yielded twelve observations for the study. However, not all respondents answered all 
questions as respondents had the option to refuse to answer. Table 4 shows how the analysis sample 
was constructed. Observations with missing covariates are removed. This does not bias the results 
as they are consistent when dummy variables are included for non-response. The final analysis 
sample includes no missing covariates and has 5265 observations.  
Table 4: Analysis sample construction 
Starting sample size 6732 
Less missing from choice question set 6510 
Less missing from technology use question set 6419 
Less missing from attitude question set 6245 
Less missing income observations 5571 
Less other missing covariates 5265 
 
Overall, farmers were willing to participate in a big data program 36% of the time. Figure 
4 shows how the big data program participation rate changes when individual attributes of the 
choice question set are examined. The likelihood of farmer participation in the big data sharing 
program was highest for university researchers and lowest for a government. Farmers are more 
willing to share their data in the presence of a non-financial incentive than in the absence of one. 
In addition, as the financial incentive for participation increased, the percent of farmers that were 
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willing to share their data increased as well. Interestingly, the number of farmers willing to 
participate when having to pay $50 is almost the same as when there is no financial incentive 
present. These descriptive statistics are reflected in the results section of this thesis.  
Figure 4: Big data program participation rates for select subsamples 
 
25%
28%
29%
37%
42%
51%
27%
29%
42%
47%
29%
38%
41%
36%
Government
Financial Institutions
Equipment Manufacturers
Grower Associations
Crop Input Suppliers
University Researchers
-$50
$0
$50
$100
None
Prescription Maps
Benchmarks
Overall
17 
 
METHOD 
 The responses to the choice questions are analyzed using a heteroscedastic probit, random 
effects probit, and latent class logit models. I assume the utility the ith individual receives from 
participating in a jth big data program is a function of the organization that runs the program, the 
financial incentive for participation, the non-financial incentive for participation, and a vector of 
individual attitude characteristics and socio-demographic data. The utility the ith individual gains 
from participating in the jth big data program is, 
𝑢௜,௝ = ෍ 𝛽௙𝐷௙,௝
௙ఢி
+ ෍ 𝛽௚𝐷௚,௝
௚ఢீ
+ ෍ 𝛽௛𝐷௛,௝
௛ఢ
+ 𝛾𝑍௜ + 𝑒௜,௝; 
where,  
𝐹 𝜖 {𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠}, 
𝐷௙,௝ = 1 if the 𝑗th program involves the 𝑓th organization,  
𝐷௙,௝ = 0 otherwise,  
𝛽௙ represents the effect of the fth organization on utility, 
𝐺 𝜖 {−$50, $0, $50, $100},  
𝐷௚,௝ = 1 if the 𝑗th program involves the 𝑔th financial incentive,  
𝐷௚,௝ = 0 otherwise,  
𝛽௚ represents the effect of the gth financial incentive on utility, 
𝐻 𝜖 {𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒, 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑝𝑠},   
𝐷௛,௝ = 1 if the 𝑗th program involves the ℎth non − financial incentive,  
𝐷௛,௝ = 0 otherwise,  
𝛽௛ represents the effect of the hth non-financial incentive on utility, 
𝑍௜ represents the vector of attitude characteristics and socio-demographic variables associated with  
individual i, 
𝛾 represents the vector of coefficients related to 𝑍௜ , and 
𝑒௜,௝ represents unobservables. 
  
If one assumes 𝑒௜ is normally distributed, then the probability that individual i chooses to 
participate in the jth big data program can be represented using the probit link function, 
Pr൫𝑦௜,௝ = 1|𝑓, 𝑔, ℎ, 𝑍௜൯ = Φ ቌ෍ 𝛽௙𝐷௙,௝
௙ఢி
+ ෍ 𝛽௚𝐷௚,௝
௚ఢீ
+ ෍ 𝛽௛𝐷௛,௝
௛ఢு
+ 𝛾𝑍௜ቍ ; 
where, 
 𝑦௜,௝ = 1 when the ith individual chooses to participate in the jth big data program, and 
𝑦௜,௝ = 0 when the ith individual chooses to not participate in the jth big data program. 
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 This relationship depends on the assumption of independence between observations, and 
homoscedasticity. However, each individual answered up to twelve choice questions in the survey, 
and one must account for possible correlation between responses from the same individual. A 
random effects probit model is chosen because it accounts for this correlation and allows for 
descriptive statistics that are constant for individual across their responses (such as farm revenue) 
to be included in the model. The results from a Breusch-Pagan test indicated heteroscedasticity 
was present in the data, rendering the maximum likelihood estimates for the probit model to be 
inconsistent. A heteroscedastic probit model was chosen to account for this, with standard errors 
clustered on the individual to account for correlation between responses from the same individual. 
The heteroscedastic probit model allows the variance to be impacted by a vector of variables, rather 
than be fixed at one. The construction of the variance equation is shown in appendix 2. Due to 
software limitation, there is no model that can fully account for both violations of homoscedasticity 
and independence, but when shown together some confidence can be placed in the consistency of 
the results. 
Versions of the heteroscedastic probit and random effects probit with different variables 
included are presented in the results section. In particular, a version including interaction terms 
between farm size by revenue class and financial incentive is included, as well as a model that 
formulates the attitude variables through factor analysis. A full explanation of the model 
construction and can be found in appendix 2.  
A latent class logit model is chosen to check for individual heterogeneity in the results. 
Here, I assume the unobservables in the utility function (𝑒) are logistically distributed. The latent 
class model performs a partition of the sample into M classes. Coefficients are then estimated for 
each class allowing for variability between classes. The probability that individual i is partitioned 
into class m is, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚|𝑍௜) =
exp{𝜃௠𝑍௜}
∑ exp{𝜃௖𝑍௜}ெ௖ୀଵ
; 
where, 
𝑍௜  is the set of variables used to partition the sample into classes, and 
𝜃 is the vector of coefficients corresponding to variables Z.  
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 Within each class, the probability that the individual chooses to participate in the big data 
program is, 
Pr൫𝑦௜,௝ = 1|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚, 𝐹௝ , 𝐺௝ , 𝐻௝൯ =
exp {𝛽௙,௠𝐹௝ + 𝛽௚,௠𝐺௝ + 𝛽௛,௠𝐻௝}
1 + exp {𝛽௙,௠𝐹௝ + 𝛽௚,௠𝐺௝ + 𝛽௛,௠𝐻௝}
. 
 The latent class logit model generates a set of coefficients for partitioning the data (𝜃), and 
a set of coefficients for organization (𝛽௙,௠), financial incentive (𝛽௚,௠), and non-financial incentive 
(𝛽௛,௠) for each class. Individuals are not assigned to a class, but rather they are assigned a 
probability of being partitioned into each class. 𝜃 impacts the probability of being partitioned into 
a class, while 𝛽௙,௠, 𝛽௚,௠, and 𝛽௛,௠ impact the probability of farmer participation in the big data 
program. The model is attempting to determine if there are groups of respondents that share 
preferences distinct from other groups. Variability in coefficients between classes indicates 
heterogeneity in the results. A full explanation of the latent class analysis can be found in appendix 
2.   
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RESULTS 
Table 5 shows the marginal effects for the results from the heteroscedastic probit and random 
effects probit models. The dependent variable was constructed from the choice questions; it equals 
one when the farmer choses to participate in the big data sharing program and equals zero when 
the farmer choses not to participate in the program. Any observation where the farmer chose not 
to respond was dropped. This does not impact the results, as the models were robust when a dummy 
variable for non-response was included. Independent variables included in the models are 
technology use variables, attitude variables, revenue range, and compensation for survey 
completion. Compensation for survey completion had no statistically significant effect on the 
probability of program participation for any of the analyses conducted.
     Table 5: Effects for heteroscedastic probit and random effects probit models  1 
 
Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2996.27 -2550.82 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.268*** 0.022 0.341*** 0.024 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.181*** 0.021 0.219*** 0.024 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.078*** 0.019 0.083*** 0.021 
Grower Associations 0.163*** 0.020 0.196*** 0.023 
Financial Institutions 0.054*** 0.019 0.065*** 0.022 
      
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.113*** 0.014 0.151*** 0.016 
Prescription Maps 0.076*** 0.014 0.108*** 0.015 
      
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50 -0.017 0.017 -0.018 0.018 
$50 0.120*** 0.019 0.154*** 0.020 
$100 0.168*** 0.019 0.219*** 0.022 
      
TECHNOLOGY USE VARIABLES (base= I do not use this technology)         
Yield Monitors      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.012 0.039 0.006 0.049 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.025 0.036 -0.034 0.046 
      
GPS Guidance      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.006 0.076 0.026 0.091 
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Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2996.27 -2550.82 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.063 0.097 -0.066 0.115 
      
Soil Sampling      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.056 0.037 0.074* 0.040 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.062 0.055 0.081 0.073 
      
Variable rate technology      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.031 0.038 0.019 0.042 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.076 0.054 -0.028 0.073 
      
Automatic Section Control      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.093*** 0.029 -0.082** 0.038 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.299*** 0.098 0.358*** 0.125 
      
ATTITUDE VARIABES         
Privacy      
Privacy is important to me -0.017 0.019 -0.02 0.021 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.027* 0.016 -0.031* 0.018 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.059*** 0.019 0.075*** 0.020 
      
Technology use      
I like to have the latest technology 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.021 
I find new technologies easy to use 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.019 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth -0.025 0.018 -0.031* 0.018 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 0.001 0.019 -0.007 0.018 
      
Farm management      
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 0.028 0.021 0.027 0.024 
I am proactive in seeking advice 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.024 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 0.013 0.015 0.02 0.018 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.032** 0.016 -0.029 0.018 
      
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)         
<$100,000 0.001 0.088 0.008 0.106 
$500,000 to $999,999 0.057 0.036 0.068 0.044 
$1 million to $2 million 0.053 0.039 0.044 0.051 
$2 million to $3 million 0.015 0.066 0.014 0.090 
>$3 million -0.154*** 0.050 -0.168*** 0.053 
      
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)         
$20 -0.012 0.032 -0.013 0.040 
$30 -0.014 0.039 -0.026 0.046 
     Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%  2 
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Organization 
Across all model specifications, farmer preferences are consistent for organization. The 
effects related to organization are interpreted as the percentage point difference in the probability 
of farmer participation between government running the big data program and the organization of 
interest running the big data program. All effects are statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  
Farmers are least willing to share their data with government. When the survey was 
administered (2017), 42 percent of people in the prairie provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba) thought the performance of the federal government was very poor. An additional 14.3 
percent of people described the federal government’s performance as somewhat poor (Mood of 
Canada Annual Tracking Survey, 2017). The ever-changing nature of government makes 
measuring long term opinions about it difficult. Farmers’ opinions about the current government 
will inform the results of this study. In addition, farmers could also be less willing to share their 
data with government out of fear of inciting regulation. Providing information to a body that has 
the authority to tax and regulate is risky. Some farmers may worry that sharing their data would 
allow government to catch them for violating current regulations. Alternatively, some farmers may 
be worried that sharing their data would allow government to uncover hidden trends and enact 
stricter regulations. Farmers could also be sceptical about what benefits government will be able 
to generate for the agriculture industry with the data. The government could be slow in innovation 
development, and disconnected from the problems farmers face.  
Second to government, farmers were least willing to share their data with equipment 
manufacturers and financial institutions. The models found no statistical difference between the 
effects for these organizations, suggesting farmers are indifferent between them. Both 
organizations have a direct business relationship with farmers. Farmers could be worried that 
providing their farm level data to these organizations will affect their pricing strategies to the 
detriment of farmers. However, crop input suppliers and grower associations also have direct 
business relationships with farmers, and they are preferred over equipment manufacturers and 
financial institutions. It could be the case that farmers believe that crop input suppliers and grower 
associations are better equipped to utilize the collected data to provide long term benefits to 
farmers than financial institutions and equipment manufacturers. The smallest effect relates to 
financial institutions. The heteroscedastic (random effects) probit model estimates the effect is 5.4 
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(6.5) percentage points. In 2016, a five-percentage point change in participation rates corresponded 
to 13,597 farm operators in Canada (CANSIM table 004-0017). Even a small change in farmer 
participation rates can have a large impact on the size and success of a big data program.  
The models found no statistical difference between the effects for crop input suppliers or 
for grower associations. These organizations were second only to university researchers in their 
big data sharing program participation rates. The probability of farmer participation with grower 
associations in charge was between 16 and 20 percentage points above government, while it was 
between 18 and 22 percentage points above government with crop input suppliers in charge. 
Grower associations are not for profit but do have a direct business relationship with farmers. They 
fund research, create educational programs, and focus on finding new markets and increasing 
demand for their products. Farmers have a high preference for this group, however it still lags 
university researchers. Part of this could be a result of farmers’ frustration about paying mandatory 
checkoff levies such as those collected by Sask Pulse. Crop input suppliers could be more preferred 
because they often provide advice to farmers about which products to use. If they have access to 
farm level data, the advice they give could be better.  
Farmers are most willing to share their data with university researchers. The 
heteroscedastic probit estimates the likelihood of farmer participation is 26.8 percentage points 
higher when university researchers run the big data program compared to government, while the 
random effects probit model estimates the effect is closer to 34.1 percentage points. University 
researchers could be the most preferred organization because they are not for profit, and do not 
have a direct business relationship with farmers. Farmers may also want to share their information 
with university researchers because they support research in agriculture. Research breakthroughs 
can have a positive effect on farm day to day operation, profit, and environmental quality.  Farmers 
might trust university researchers more because they are viewed as impartial with no political or 
business agenda.  
The ability of different organizations to extract value from a big dataset may also play into 
farmers willingness to participate. Universities can touch the edges of a multitude of farm 
problems, and so could potentially extract more value out of a big dataset. This could contribute 
to universities being the most preferred organization. On the other hand, organizations such as 
financial institutions have a narrower scope in the services they provide to farmers, and so farmers 
are less willing to share their data in this case.  
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Non-financial incentive 
The effects for non-financial incentive are statistically and economically significant in the 
heteroscedastic and random effects probit models. In the heteroscedastic (random effects) probit 
model, benchmark statistics increase the probability of participation in the big data program by 
11.3 (15.1) percentage points, while prescription maps increase the probability of program 
participation by 7.6 (10.8) percentage points. Benchmarks may be preferred to prescription maps 
because prescription maps are only useful to those farmers that use variable rate technology (29% 
of the analysis sample). Benchmark statistics could be useful to every farmer regardless of the 
equipment available to them. Farmers can use benchmark statistics to compare their own 
performance with that of comparable farming operations and look for areas where improvements 
in efficiency could be made. The positive marginal impact on benchmarks could also be explained 
by the rank income hypothesis. The rank income hypothesis states that people care more about 
their income rank rather than their absolute level of income (Boyce, Brown, and Moore, 2010). 
Farmers not only care about their individual productivity, but also are interested in how they 
perform in relation to other farmers. People gain utility from comparing their level of income to 
those around them, or to past levels of income they experienced themselves rather than the absolute 
value of their income (Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2008).  
 
Financial incentive, revenue range, and interaction terms 
 Farmers are more willing to participate in a big data program in the presence of a financial 
incentive. In the heteroscedastic (random effects) probit model, farmers are 12.0 (16.8) percentage 
points more likely to participate if offered $50, and 15.4 (21.9) percentage points more likely to 
participate if offered $100 than if no incentive is offered. Paying $50 for the right to participate 
has no statistically significant effect on farmers’ willingness to participate. This is counter to 
expectations and surprising considering the statistical strength of the coefficients related to positive 
financial compensation. A positive financial incentive affects participation rates, while a monetary 
contribution for participation does not. 
These financial rewards are relatively small in comparison to total farm revenue, which 
can range to over $3 million each year. If farmers have strong privacy preferences these financial 
rewards should not induce them to share their information so easily. These results are an example 
of the privacy paradox consistent with Athey, Catalini, and Tucker (2017).  
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The revenue range $100,000-$499,999 was chosen as the base for the farm revenue 
variables because it is the group with the largest number of farmers in it in the analysis sample. 
Farm revenue does not affect farmers’ willingness to participate in a big data sharing program, 
except for the largest farms. Farmers whose operations generate the most revenue (>$3 million per 
year) are 15.4 (16.8) percentage points less likely to share their data than those that generate 
$100,000-$499,999 in revenue per year in the heteroscedastic (random effects) probit models. 
Farmers running larger operations generally do not generate off farm income, instead focussing all 
their effort on managing the farm. Farmers running larger operations have more vested interests in 
agriculture because they have more at stake financially than farmers running smaller operations. 
This could cause larger farmers to be more private. Alternatively, larger farmers might not see 
value beyond the participation incentive for participation. Very large farms generate lots of data, 
and may have some capacity to do analysis themselves.   
A second specification of the models was run including interaction terms between financial 
incentive and farm revenue. This was done to account for heterogeneity in the results. The effects 
for financial incentive may not be the same for all respondents. Farmers that generate different 
levels of revenue may have different marginal utilities for additional income, in this case the 
financial incentive. The effects for the interaction terms are shown in table 6. The effects for 
financial incentive remain consistent with what was found in the model excluding control 
variables.  
The overall revenue effects in the model with interaction terms differ slightly from the base 
model. The effect of >$3 million becomes insignificant, likely captured by the interaction term 
between $100 financial incentive and revenue >$3 million. This interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant. In addition, the revenue range $500,000 to $999,999 becomes statistically 
significant and positive, suggesting farmers that generate revenue in this range are more likely to 
participate in a big data sharing program.  
 The interaction terms do not reveal underlying heterogeneity in the results. The terms that 
are statistically significant are the interaction terms between $100 financial incentive and >$3 
million in revenue, and between $50 financial incentive and $500,000 to $999,999 in revenue (in 
the random effects probit model only). In the heteroscedastic probit, the Wald test statistic is 19.11 
(p-value is 0.22) when testing between the base model and the model including the interaction 
terms. This suggests that the base model is more appropriate. In the random effects probit, the 
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Wald test statistic is 23.1 (p-value is 0.08) when testing between the base model and the model 
including the interaction terms. This suggests the model that includes the interaction terms is more 
appropriate. There is no overwhelming evidence suggesting systematic underlying heterogeneity 
exists in the results related to farm revenue and financial incentive.  
 
Table 6: Effects of interaction terms between farm revenue and financial incentive  
  
Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
FINANCIAL INCENTIVE (base= $0)         
-$50     -0.032 0.025 -0.036 0.031 
$50     0.142*** 0.030 0.205*** 0.034 
$100    0.178*** 0.035 0.251*** 0.039 
       
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000-$499,999)         
<$100,000  0.027 0.117 0.069 0.146 
$500,000 to $999,999 0.070* 0.041 0.097** 0.054 
$1 million to $2 million  0.040 0.049 0.045 0.059 
$2 million to $3 million -0.011 0.076 0.029 0.099 
>$3 million -0.089 0.074 -0.092 0.082 
      
INTERACTION TERMS         
Fin. Incentive  Revenue Range (base = $100,000-$499,999)    
-$50 
 <$100,000 -0.186 0.240 -0.145 0.133 
 $500,000 to $999,999 0.018 0.041 0.013 0.051 
 $1 million to $2 million 0.053 0.049 0.069 0.057 
 $2 million to $3 million 0.207 0.198 0.119 0.076 
 >$3 million 0.024 0.116 -0.011 0.127 
$50 
 <$100,000 -0.005 0.161 -0.057 0.162 
 $500,000 to $999,999 -0.052 0.039 -0.088** 0.048 
 $1 million to $2 million 0.006 0.068 -0.031 0.052 
 $2 million to $3 million -0.016 0.213 -0.108 0.085 
 >$3 million -0.106 0.099 -0.153 0.122 
$100 
 <$100,000 -0.026 0.154 -0.061 0.133 
 $500,000 to $999,999 -0.007 0.054 -0.033 0.053 
 $1 million to $2 million -0.006 0.072 -0.033 0.055 
 $2 million to $3 million 0.179 0.306 -0.054 0.094 
  >$3 million -0.176** 0.084 -0.198** 0.106 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
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Technology use 
None of the technology use questions yielded a statistically significant result except the 
use of automatic section control. In the results of the survey, only four individuals (totalling 48 
observations) answered “I use this technology, but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance” for 
automatic section control. The rest of the respondents were equally split between not using the 
technology and answering, “I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance”. The 
limited response to “I use this technology, but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance” reduces 
confidence in the estimated effects. Forty-eight observations over four individuals is too small of 
a sample to draw a decisive conclusion. However, more confidence can be place in the marginal 
effect related to “I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance”. Those farmers 
that responded positively to that statement are between 8.2 and 9.5 percentage points less likely to 
participate in a big data program than those that do not use automatic section control.  
 
Attitude Variables 
The attitude variables are analyzed in the subsets of statements on privacy (first three 
statements), technology use (next four statements), and farm management (final four statements). 
The statements are first analyzed individually, and then using factor analysis. The marginal effects 
for the individual analysis are interpreted as the percentage point change in willingness to 
participate in a big data program from a one-point increase in the level of agreement with the 
statement. The level of agreement is measured on a five-point scale, with one being strongly 
disagree and five being strongly agree. The marginal effects for the individual analysis can be 
found in table 1, while the marginal effects for the factor analysis can be found in table 7. 
Attitudes concerning privacy had the largest impact on farmers’ willingness to participate 
in a big data program. The only statement from any category that showed consistently strong 
statistically significant results was “I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm”. This 
is intuitive, as the choice questions are attempting to capture willingness to share information. It 
lends evidence that survey respondents were consistent in their preferences when asked about 
privacy. The marginal effect on “I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about 
my farm” was weakly significant and negative.  
None of the technology use statements were strongly statistically significant, however, 
“New technology is more hassle than it is worth” yielded a weakly significant negative result in 
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the random effects probit model. Those that struggle to see the value of new technology are less 
willing to adopt new technology and farming practices, including participation in a big data 
program. In addition, only one of the farm management statements was found to be weakly 
significant in the heteroscedastic probit model. “I know better than others how to manage risk on 
my farm” was found to have a negative relationship with farmers’ willingness to participate in a 
big data program. These results suggest that as a farmer has a more independent managing style, 
they become less willing to participate in a big data program. The low statistical significance of 
most of the effects of the attitude variables could be a result of multicollinearity in the data. The 
statements are each attempting to capture one of three measures (privacy attitudes, technology use 
attitudes, or farm management attitudes) and so should be highly correlated. Tests for joint 
significance within each subcategory of the attitude variables in the heteroscedastic (random 
effects) probit revealed p-values of 0.00 (0.00) for privacy, 0.51 (0.26) for technology use, and 
0.03 (0.24) for farm management.  
Factor analysis condenses the statements in each category into one measure, capturing as 
much original variation in the statements as possible. A more thorough explanation of the 
construction of the factors can be found in appendix 2. The marginal effects are shown in table 3. 
The sizes of the marginal effects are uninterpretable as the exact construction and units of each 
factor is unknown. However, I multiply the marginal effect by the standard deviation for each 
factor to gain some insight into the economic significance of the effects.  
Table 7: Effects for factors generated by factor analysis 
 Het Probit RE Probit 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
Privacy (increases with increasing strictness in privacy 
preferences) 
-0.055*** 0.010 -0.076*** 0.012 
Technology use (increases with more favourable attitudes 
towards technology) 
0.021 0.014 0.021 0.017 
Farm management (increases with increasing 
progressiveness in farm management style) 
0.025* 0.013 0.025 0.016 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
Privacy has the largest impact on farmers’ willingness to participate, and the only strongly 
statistically significant one. The standard deviation related to the privacy factor is 1.29. An increase 
of one standard deviation in the privacy factor relates to a decrease of 7.1 (9.8) percentage points 
in the probability of farmer participation in a big data sharing program in the heteroscedastic 
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(random effects) probit model. As privacy attitudes become stricter, willingness to participate in a 
big data program is decreased. Technology use attitudes and farm management attitudes do not 
significantly impact farmers’ willingness to participate in a big data sharing program, although 
farm management attitudes have a weak relationship with program participation in the 
heteroscedastic probit model. The results from the factor analysis are consistent with the results 
from the individual analysis.  
 
Robustness Check: How well does the analysis sample represent the overall population?  
 To test for self-selection bias, I compare respondents in the first and fourth quartiles of 
respondents by the date the survey was completed. Respondents completed the survey voluntarily, 
meaning there were farmers asked to complete the survey but that chose not to. There could be 
self-selection bias if those that chose to respond to the survey are different than those that chose 
not to respond. Out of farmers that chose to respond, there were fast responders (those in the first 
quartile of respondents) and slow responders (those in the last quartile of respondents). Farmers 
that did not respond to the survey are more likely to be similar to slow respondents than fast 
respondents. Assuming non-respondents are similar to slow respondents, differences between slow 
respondents and fast respondents lends evidence towards a sample self-selection bias.  
To test this, I compare the first and fourth quartiles of respondents in order of response 
time by running a pooled and segmented heteroscedstic probit and random effects probit excluding 
observations in the second and third quartiles. I use a Wald test to determine if the pooled model 
is more appropriate than the segmented model. The results are in table 8. There is no evidence of 
sample selection bias in the heteroscedastic probit model, however there is evidence of sample 
selection bias in the random effects probit model. The stark differences in the results from the 
Wald tests can be attributed to the marginal effect on financial institutions. In the random effects 
probit model, this marginal impact is statistically significant in quartile 1 but not in quartile 4. This 
is the only significant difference found between quartiles. The ordering of organization, financial 
incentive, and non-financial incentive remains consistent between quartiles. The full result tables 
from the quartile analysis can be found in appendix 1.   
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Table 8: Wald test results for quartile analysis 
  Wald Test 
Statistic P-value Conclusion 
Het. Probit 2.28 1.00 
There is no statistical difference between any 
coefficients for the 1st and 4th quartiles. No 
evidence of sample selection bias.  
RE Probit 30.80 0.07 
At a 10% level of significance, at least one 
coefficient is different between the 1st and 4th 
quartiles. Evidence of sample selection bias.  
 
 In addition to testing between models by quartiles, I performed a comparison of means for 
the attitude variables between quartiles. The results are found in table 9. A low p-value indicates 
significant differences between the means in quartile 1 and quartile 4. The respondents in quartile 
4 appear to be more technologically savvy than those in quartile 1. However, the differences do 
not appear to be large, and the responses between statements appears to be consistent (for example, 
respondents agreed more with the first statement than with the second statement). In addition, those 
in quartile 4 are statistically significantly younger by 1.73 years.  
Table 9: Comparison of means between Q1 and Q4 for attitude variables 
  Q1 Q4 p-value1 
Privacy is important to me 4.02 4.06 0.39 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm 3.06 3.27 0 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 3.22 3.33 0 
I like to have the latest technology 3.22 3.45 0 
I find new technologies easy to use 3.24 3.43 0 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth 2.69 2.55 0 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 3.32 3.28 0.28 
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 3.64 3.72 0.01 
I am proactive in seeking advice 3.9 3.86 0.36 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 4.04 3.9 0 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm 3.71 3.64 0.06 
1 p-value from a paired t-test comparing group means 
 
Latent Class Analysis 
Latent class analysis was performed to determine if there are heterogeneities in the 
population of grain farmers in Saskatchewan. Two sets of coefficients are generated in latent class 
analysis. The first varies between classes, in this analysis, organization, financial incentive, and 
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non-financial incentive. The second set of coefficients relates a set of variables (Z) to the 
probability of class membership. The probability that individual i is in class m is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑚|𝑍௜) =
exp{𝜃௠𝑍௜}
∑ exp{𝜃௖𝑍௜}ெ௖ୀଵ
, 
where, 
𝑍௜  is the set of variables used to partition the sample into classes, and 
𝜃 is the vector of coefficients corresponding to variables Z. 
The latent class analysis is performed on four different sets of variables in Z. The first 
includes an intercept term, the second includes socio-demographic indicators, the third includes 
the attitude statements, and the fourth includes technology use information. The results presented 
here are from the model including socio-demographic indicators (𝑍ଶ௜), 
(1) 𝑍ଵ௜ = 1, 
(2) 𝑍ଶ௜ = 1 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒௜ + 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟௜ + ∑ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௘௜௘ఢா + ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒௥௜௥ఢோ , 
(3) 𝑍ଷ௜ = 1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠௔௜௔ఢ஺ , 
(4) 𝑍ସ௜ = 1 + ∑ 𝐼 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ. 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑛ᇱ𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௧௜௧ఢ் +
∑ 𝐼 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௧௜௧ఢ் , 
where,  
i  is an index for individual, 
𝐸 𝜖 {𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑆𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒, 
University degree,𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒}, 
𝑅 𝜖 {< $100,000, $500,000 − $999,999, $1M − $2M, $2M − $3M, > $3M}, 
𝐴 𝜖 {11 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠}, and 
𝑇 𝜖 {𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝐺𝑃𝑆, 𝑆𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑙}. 
Using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), a three-class model was selected. This is 
the most appropriate model for all 𝑍௜, as the BIC is lowest (table 10).   
Table 10: BIC values for different numbers of classes and Z  
Number 
of Classes Z1i Z2i Z3i Z4i 
2 5570 5648 5608 5626 
3 5476 5646 5592 5609 
4 5498 * 5700 5693 
5 5543 * * 5816 
* model convergence was not achieved  
32 
 
The coefficients for the three-class model with socio-demographic indicators in the 
membership equation are shown in table 11. Class one contained 33% of respondents, class two 
contained 20% of respondents, and class three contained 47% of respondents. Based on the 
generated coefficients, class one is labelled as “Likely Non-participants”, class two is labelled as 
“Money Lovers”, and class three is labelled as “Majority Group”. Likely Non-participants get their 
name from the large negative intercept in class one, Money Lovers get their name from the large 
coefficients on financial incentive, and the Majority Group gets it’s name because 47% of 
respondents fall into this category.  
Table 11: Coefficients and standard errors for three class model, socio-demographics in the 
membership equation (𝒁𝟐𝒊) 
 
The estimated coefficients change between classes, but the ordering of preferences remain 
consistent except for small variations. The orderings of preferences for organization are consistent 
with previous results, except crop input suppliers are the most preferred organization in class two 
Class probabilities
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -6.05*** 0.941 -1.05*** 0.302 -2.32*** 0.218
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 2.63*** 0.828 1.51*** 0.342 2.04*** 0.184
Crop Input Suppliers 2.41*** 0.866 1.60*** 0.336 1.19*** 0.185
Equipment Manufacturers 0.333 1.29 1.07*** 0.323 0.471** 0.196
Grower Associations 1.97** 0.871 1.31*** 0.331 1.17*** 0.180
Financial Institutions 1.18 0.931 0.748** 0.316 0.342* 0.187
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.701* 0.390 0.770*** 0.234 1.01*** 0.128
Prescription Maps 0.954** 0.380 0.466** 0.217 0.719*** 0.125
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.099 0.515 0.310 0.229 0.007 0.148
$50 0.933** 0.448 2.76*** 0.663 0.607*** 0.156
$100 1.21*** 0.447 2.06*** 0.332 1.13*** 0.152
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Log-likelihood: -2570.14
Class1 Class 2 Class 3
33% 20% 47%
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rather than university researchers, and the coefficients on equipment manufacturers and financial 
institutions are not significantly different from zero in class one.  
 In previous results, benchmark statistics were preferred to prescription maps for non-
financial incentive. This is true in class two and class three, but the opposite is true in class one. 
Prescription maps are valuable only to the subset of farmers that use variable rate technology. To 
these farmers, the value of prescription maps may be high, while other farmers may not place much 
value on prescription maps. However, when analyzing the membership equation with technology 
use variables included (𝑍ସ௜), the use of variable rate technology is not related to class membership. 
Individuals are not more likely to be in class one if they use variable rate technology.  
 Consistent with previous results in this thesis, a monetary contribution from the farmer for 
participation does not decrease farmers’ willingness to participate in a big data program in any 
class. Coefficients on positive financial incentive are consistent with previous results in class one 
and class three, but in the Money Lovers class a $50 incentive is proffered to a $100 incentive. In 
addition, the coefficients in class two are much larger than those in class one or class three, 
suggesting individuals in class two are more easily incentivized by monetary measures than other 
people.  
 The largest difference between classes emerges in the intercept term. People in class one 
are least likely to participate in a big data program, followed by people in class two, and people in 
class three. The size of the intercept in class one is 6.4 times the size of the intercept in class three, 
and 2.8 times the size of the intercept in class two. Identifying which class an individual belongs 
to is important in understanding their willingness to participate in a big data program.  
 The overall partial effects are shown in table 2. They are consistent with the effects found 
in previous results.   
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Table 12: Overall partial effects for latent class logit, socio-demographic indicators in the 
membership equation (𝒁𝟐𝒊) 
 
 
 None of the vectors included in the membership equations (Z) yielded results that had 
significant impacts on the probability of class membership. Full tables showing these results can 
be found in appendix 1. The coefficients with socio-demographic indicators in the membership 
equation are shown in table 13.   
Partial 
Effect Elasticity
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 0.413*** 0.262
Crop Input Suppliers 0.324*** 0.206
Equipment Manufacturers 0.106 0.067
Grower Associations 0.283*** 0.180
Financial Institutions 0.136** 0.086
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.167*** 0.212
Prescription Maps 0.145*** 0.183
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.019 0.018
$50 0.221*** 0.210
$100 0.260*** 0.248
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
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Table 13: Coefficients impacting class membership (base = class 3), socio-demographic 
indicators included in the membership equation (𝒁𝟐𝒊) 
 
The latent class analysis indicates that some heterogeneities exist within the farmer 
population in Saskatchewan. However, those heterogeneities are not strongly related to any of the 
Z vectors specified in this thesis. It is therefore difficult to predict which class an individual belongs 
to. Without the ability to identify which class an individual belongs to; the latent class analysis has 
few real world implications. The classes may exist, but if we cannot match them with the people 
that are in them, we cannot tailor incentives to classes.  
 
  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -0.203 0.904 -0.629 1.21
Age 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.015
Sex 0.247 0.600 -0.125 0.624
Education (base = highschool)
Less than highschool -0.537 0.592 -0.133 0.725
Some post secondary education -0.913** 0.365 -0.545 0.472
College degree 0.047 0.493 0.263 0.600
University degree -1.11*** 0.427 -0.563 0.527
Graduate degree -0.504 0.725 -0.690 1.00
Revenue range (base = $100,000 - $499,999)
<$100,000 0.761 0.788 0.615 0.911
$500,000 to $999,999 -0.689** 0.313 -0.262 0.334
$1 million to $2 million -0.481 28.6 -0.451 30.2
$2 million to $3 million -0.420 98.4 -0.841 96.8
>$3 million 0.968 25.9 -2.05 32.1
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Class 1 Class 2
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The development of a big data sharing program is the first step for researchers to perform regional 
and Canada wide big data analysis in agriculture. Government, farmers, producer groups, and 
corporations are currently missing out on the value of potential technological and organizational 
advancements made doing this type of analysis. The construction of a big data sharing program 
brings these abstract benefits closer to reality. The value of a big database increases with size, so 
high farmer participation rates are important. This thesis examines farmers’ willingness to 
participate in a big data program, and how the organization administering the program, financial 
incentive for participation, and non-financial incentives for participation impact farmers’ 
willingness to participate.  
The results are consistent across all models. Farmers are most willing to share their data 
with university researchers, then crop input suppliers or grower associations, followed by financial 
institutions or equipment manufacturers, and government. Farmers are more willing to share their 
data in the presence of any positive financial or non-financial incentive, but a negative financial 
incentive has no impact on willingness to participate.  
It is important to note that the construction of the survey doesn’t allow for the big data 
sharing program to vary in its structure between organizations. In reality, a big data program run 
by a university could look very different than one run by a different organization, both in terms of 
how it is administered, and what the end use goals are. Farmers may be more sympathetic with the 
objectives of a certain organization, and this could contribute the differences in willingness to 
participate between organizations. In addition, the farmers surveyed were commercial farmers 
rather than hobby farmers, which could also impact willingness to participate.  
These results imply that a big data program run by a university would generate higher 
response rates than one run by the other types of organizations studied in this thesis. Organizations 
other than universities interested in pioneering a big data sharing program may be better off 
contracting through a university to run it. This is especially true for government, as the difference 
in participation rates could be as high as 34 percentage points. For organizations such as crop input 
suppliers and grower associations, the difference in participation rates ranges from 8.7 to 14.5 
percentage points, so the additional cost of contracting through a university may not be worth it. 
These companies could make up for the lower participation rates by increasing the financial 
incentive for participation. This would also increase the cost of the program, but it could still be 
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more affordable than paying a university to administer it. However, contracting through a 
university must be done carefully. If it becomes blatantly obvious that the university is simply 
acting as a middle man, trust in the university could be eroded, and participation rates could drop.  
A larger financial compensation increases the participation rate but also increases cost with 
each respondent. The presence of a non-financial incentive also increases the participation rate, 
but costs do not increase linearly with the number of respondents. Non-financial incentives can be 
more difficult to offer because they must be tailored for each respondent. Although for some 
organizations such as grower associations, providing these non-financial benefits to farmers may 
be the very reason for the big data program in the first place. Program administrators can make a 
fixed investment cost in the development of a program that generates non-financial incentives for 
respondents quickly and easily. The least cost method of increasing participation rates will depend 
on the efficiency of generating non-financial incentives, and the number of farmers participating 
in the big data program.  
The latent class logit model revealed some heterogeneities in the farmer population. The 
ordering of coefficients remained relatively consistent between classes, but large differences in the 
intercept term were found. Farmers in class one are least likely to participate in a big data program, 
while farmers in class three are most likely to participate in a big data program. The explanatory 
power of socio-demographic indicators, attitude statements, and current technology use on class 
membership was low. These results do not find a good indicator of class membership.  
Farmers may be hesitant to share their data if they feel someone else is profiting off it. 
There could be a sense that the data belongs to the farmer, and any profits made from it should 
also go to the farmer. This could be the case for big data programs operated by for profit groups 
like crop input suppliers, equipment manufacturers, and financial institutions. Grower associations 
and universities are generally non-profit. Farmers may prefer these because it does not feel as if 
someone is getting rich off their backs. 
 There are also positive impacts on farmers for participation. It is in farmers’ best interest 
to foster innovation in agriculture, as they are the ones that will see the eventual impacts. 
Innovations developed by university researchers could have significant positive impacts on 
farmers. Crop input suppliers, equipment manufacturers, and financial institutions may be better 
able to serve farmers if they have access to more detailed information about them. This could be a 
good thing for both farmers and the companies serving them.  
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A limitation of this study is that the entire sample was induced to respond to the survey 
through financial measures. This suggests that they are a group that cares about marginal financial 
rewards. Farmers who place less value on money (or a higher cost on responding to surveys) might 
be excluded from the sample. People incentivized by money once may be more inclined to be 
incentivized by it again. This could inflate the effects of the financial compensation variables. In 
addition, the survey was administered online. Farmers must have had an email address, and access 
to the internet to complete the survey. This might have excluded less technologically oriented 
individuals from the sample. The quartile analysis suggests that sample selection bias is not a 
problem, however there could be biases that the quartile analysis was not able to detect.  
Questions surrounding data ownership remain. Depending on the legal ownership of the 
data, the structure of a big data sharing program could vary widely. If farmers do not have the legal 
right to their data, corporations may be able to collect it without farmers permission. This is an 
area in which government must clarify the rules before a program is put in place.  
Further research could be done exploring the latent class model. Identifying indicators that 
are related to class membership could open some real world implication for the latent class logit 
model. If there is an observable characteristic with which the probability of class membership is 
highly correlated, identifying which farmers are predisposed to more readily sharing their data 
could help match incentives with individuals. Perhaps there is a system where some individuals 
are offered one incentive, and other individuals are offered a different incentive. This could reduce 
costs for the program administrator.   
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APPENDIX 1: Full Results Tables 
Table A1.1: Specification 1: Control Variables 
 
 
 
Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2996.27 -2550.82 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.268*** 0.022 0.341*** 0.024 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.181*** 0.021 0.219*** 0.024 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.078*** 0.019 0.083*** 0.021 
Grower Associations 0.163*** 0.020 0.196*** 0.023 
Financial Institutions 0.054*** 0.019 0.065*** 0.022 
      
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.113*** 0.014 0.151*** 0.016 
Prescription Maps 0.076*** 0.014 0.108*** 0.015 
      
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50 -0.017 0.017 -0.018 0.018 
$50 0.120*** 0.019 0.154*** 0.020 
$100 0.168*** 0.019 0.219*** 0.022 
      
TECHNOLOGY USE VARIABLES (base= I do not use this technology)         
Yield Monitors      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.012 0.039 0.006 0.049 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.025 0.036 -0.034 0.046 
      
GPS Guidance      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.006 0.076 0.026 0.091 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.063 0.097 -0.066 0.115 
      
Soil Sampling      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.056 0.037 0.074* 0.040 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.062 0.055 0.081 0.073 
      
Variable rate technology      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.031 0.038 0.019 0.042 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.076 0.054 -0.028 0.073 
      
Automatic Section Control      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.093*** 0.029 -0.082** 0.038 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.299*** 0.098 0.358*** 0.125 
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Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2996.27 -2550.82 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
      
ATTITUDE VARIABES         
Privacy      
Privacy is important to me -0.017 0.019 -0.02 0.021 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.027* 0.016 -0.031* 0.018 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.059*** 0.019 0.075*** 0.020 
      
Technology use      
I like to have the latest technology 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.021 
I find new technologies easy to use 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.019 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth -0.025 0.018 -0.031* 0.018 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 0.001 0.019 -0.007 0.018 
      
Farm management      
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 0.028 0.021 0.027 0.024 
I am proactive in seeking advice 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.024 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 0.013 0.015 0.02 0.018 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.032** 0.016 -0.029 0.018 
      
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)         
<$100,000 0.001 0.088 0.008 0.106 
$500,000 to $999,999 0.057 0.036 0.068 0.044 
$1 million to $2 million 0.053 0.039 0.044 0.051 
$2 million to $3 million 0.015 0.066 0.014 0.090 
>$3 million -0.154*** 0.050 -0.168*** 0.053 
      
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)         
$20 -0.012 0.032 -0.013 0.040 
$30 -0.014 0.039 -0.026 0.046 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
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Table A1.2: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for base model heteroscedastic probit 
 
 
  
Coef. Std. Err
CHOICE VARIABLES
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers -0.374 0.248
Crop Input Suppliers -0.409* 0.214
Equipment Manufacturers -0.253 0.195
Grower Associations -0.420** 0.199
Financial Institutions -0.174 0.218
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.008 0.093
Prescription Maps 0.258** 0.104
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.085 0.138
$50 0.009 0.144
$100 0.149 0.142
ATTITUDE STATEMENTS
Privacy is important to me 0.001 0.167
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.075 0.084
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.013 0.135
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.079 0.143
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)
<$100,000 0.361 0.622
$500,000 to $999,999 0.05 0.214
$1 million to $2 million 0.211 0.279
$2 million to $3 million 1.34** 0.671
>$3 million 0.094 0.421
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)
$20 0.191 0.217
$30 0.415 0.293
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Table A1.3: Specification 2: Interaction terms between financial incentive and revenue range 
  
Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2988.39 -2532.71 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.269*** 0.022 0.341*** 0.024 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.180*** 0.021 0.217*** 0.023 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.077*** 0.019 0.084*** 0.021 
Grower Associations 0.162*** 0.021 0.195*** 0.023 
Financial Institutions 0.054*** 0.020 0.065*** 0.022 
     
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.113*** 0.014 0.150*** 0.016 
Prescription Maps 0.076*** 0.014 0.107*** 0.015 
          
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50     -0.032 0.025 -0.036 0.031 
$50     0.142*** 0.030 0.205*** 0.034 
$100    0.178*** 0.035 0.251*** 0.039 
     
TECHNOLOGY USE VARIABLES (base= I do not use this 
technology)         
Yield Monitors      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.014 0.039 0.005 0.049 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.023 0.037 -0.036 0.046 
     
GPS Guidance      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.004 0.084 0.026 0.091 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.069 0.103 -0.067 0.115 
     
Soil Sampling      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.055 0.038 0.076* 0.040 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.065 0.056 0.083 0.073 
     
Variable rate technology      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.027 0.039 0.018 0.042 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.069 0.057 -0.029 0.073 
     
Automatic Section Control      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.095*** 0.030 -0.082** 0.039 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.292*** 0.100 0.360*** 0.126 
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Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2988.39 -2532.71 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
ATTITUDE VARIABES         
Privacy      
Privacy is important to me -0.018 0.019 -0.019 0.021 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.027* 0.016 -0.031* 0.018 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.057*** 0.021 0.075*** 0.020 
     
Technology use      
I like to have the latest technology 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.021 
I find new technologies easy to use 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.019 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth -0.026 0.018 -0.031* 0.018 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm -0.002 0.020 -0.007 0.018 
     
Farm management      
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 0.029 0.022 0.026 0.024 
I am proactive in seeking advice 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.024 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.017 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.030* 0.017 -0.030* 0.018 
          
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000-$499,999)         
<$100,000     0.027 0.117 0.069 0.146 
$500,000 to $999,999     0.070* 0.041 0.097** 0.054 
$1 million to $2 million     0.040 0.049 0.045 0.059 
$2 million to $3 million     -0.011 0.076 0.029 0.099 
>$3 million     -0.089 0.074 -0.092 0.082 
     
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)         
$20 -0.009 0.032 -0.013 0.040 
$30 -0.015 0.038 -0.026 0.046 
       
INTERACTION TERMS             
Financial 
Compensation   Revenue Range (base = $100,000-$499,999)    
-$50 
 <$100,000 -0.186 0.240 -0.145 0.133 
 $500,000 to $999,999 0.018 0.041 0.013 0.051 
 $1 million to $2 million 0.053 0.049 0.069 0.057 
 $2 million to $3 million 0.207 0.198 0.119 0.076 
 >$3 million 0.024 0.116 -0.011 0.127 
$50 
 <$100,000 -0.005 0.161 -0.057 0.162 
 $500,000 to $999,999 -0.052 0.039 -0.088** 0.048 
 $1 million to $2 million 0.006 0.068 -0.031 0.052 
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Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -2988.39 -2532.71 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
 $2 million to $3 million -0.016 0.213 -0.108 0.085 
 >$3 million -0.106 0.099 -0.153 0.122 
$100 
 <$100,000 -0.026 0.154 -0.061 0.133 
 $500,000 to $999,999 -0.007 0.054 -0.033 0.053 
 $1 million to $2 million -0.006 0.072 -0.033 0.055 
 $2 million to $3 million 0.179 0.306 -0.054 0.094 
  >$3 million -0.176** 0.084 -0.198** 0.106 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
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Table A1.4: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for heteroscedastic probit with interaction 
terms between revenue and financial incentive 
 
  
Coef. Std. Err
CHOICE VARIABLES
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers -0.412* 0.249
Crop Input Suppliers -0.438* 0.235
Equipment Manufacturers -0.263 0.2
Grower Associations -0.476** 0.211
Financial Institutions -0.191 0.229
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.004 0.094
Prescription Maps 0.250** 0.103
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.077 0.133
$50 0.034 0.149
$100 0.207 0.153
ATTITUDE STATEMENTS
Privacy is important to me 0.015 0.177
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.085 0.086
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.019 0.154
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.091 0.151
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)
<$100,000 0.472 0.808
$500,000 to $999,999 -0.017 0.248
$1 million to $2 million 0.129 0.35
$2 million to $3 million 1.26* 0.698
>$3 million -0.144 0.493
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)
$20 0.197 0.238
$30 0.469 0.34
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Table A1.5: Specification 3: Factor Analysis  
 
 
 
Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -3016.73 -2550.57 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.262*** 0.024 0.343*** 0.024 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.175*** 0.022 0.221*** 0.024 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.074*** 0.018 0.083*** 0.021 
Grower Associations 0.156*** 0.021 0.197*** 0.023 
Financial Institutions 0.052*** 0.019 0.065*** 0.022 
      
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.111*** 0.014 0.152*** 0.016 
Prescription Maps 0.078*** 0.014 0.108*** 0.015 
      
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50 -0.017 0.016 -0.018 0.018 
$50 0.110*** 0.019 0.155*** 0.020 
$100 0.162*** 0.019 0.221*** 0.022 
      
TECHNOLOGY USE VARIABLES (base= I do not use this technology)       
Yield Monitors        
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.014 0.037 -0.002 0.050 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.029 0.035 -0.041 0.047 
      
GPS Guidance      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.002 0.072 0.034 0.089 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.056 0.089 -0.066 0.114 
      
Soil Sampling      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.053 0.032 0.088** 0.040 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.054 0.052 0.07 0.074 
      
Variable rate technology      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.035 0.036 0.022 0.042 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -0.071 0.049 -0.041 0.070 
      
Automatic Section Control      
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.089*** 0.029 -0.083** 0.039 
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.283*** 0.096 0.364*** 0.123 
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Heteroscedastic 
Probit 
Random Effects 
Probit 
Log pseudolikelihood -3016.73 -2550.57 
Number of observations 5265 5265 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err.  
ATTITUDE VARIABES       
Privacy (increases with increasing strictness in privacy preferences) -0.055*** 0.010 -0.076*** 0.012 
Technology use (increases with more favourable attitudes towards 
technology) 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.017 
Farm management (increases with increasing progressiveness in farm 
management style) 0.025* 0.013 0.025 0.016 
      
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)       
<$100,000 0.002 0.074 0.000 0.104 
$500,000 to $999,999 0.072** 0.033 0.079* 0.045 
$1 million to $2 million 0.069* 0.038 0.052 0.051 
$2 million to $3 million 0.043 0.062 0.018 0.087 
>$3 million -0.135*** 0.048 -0.165*** 0.053 
      
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)       
$20 -0.011 0.030 -0.015 0.040 
$30 -0.014 0.038 -0.016 0.047 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
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Table A1.6: Variables and coefficients impacting variance for heteroscedastic probit with factor analysis 
for attitude variables 
 
 
 
  
Coef. Std. Err
CHOICE VARIABLES
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers -0.278 0.266
Crop Input Suppliers -0.372 0.228
Equipment Manufacturers -0.245 0.19
Grower Associations -0.379* 0.213
Financial Institutions -0.119 0.228
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.026 0.1
Prescription Maps 0.251** 0.107
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.057 0.123
$50 0.056 0.142
$100 0.184 0.139
ATTITUDE STATEMENTS
Privacy is important to me 0.065 0.074
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.049 0.07
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.091 0.087
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.217** 0.099
REVENUE RANGE (base = $100,000 to $499,999)
<$100,000 0.343 0.518
$500,000 to $999,999 -0.049 0.18
$1 million to $2 million 0.118 0.206
$2 million to $3 million 1.25* 0.675
>$3 million -0.132 0.371
COMPENSATION FOR SURVEY COMPLETION (base = $10)
$20 0.193 0.164
$30 0.496 0.307
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Table A1.7: Marginal Effects for Quartile Analysis; Heteroscedastic Probit 
 
Quartile 1 Diff. between Q1 and Q4 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.302*** 0.043 -0.058 0.065 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.203*** 0.045 -0.050 0.074 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.030 0.040 0.004 0.068 
Grower Associations 0.199*** 0.041 -0.063 0.062 
Financial Institutions 0.052 0.038 0.018 0.071 
      
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.085*** 0.030 0.015 0.039 
Prescription Maps 0.046 0.031 0.051 0.049 
      
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50 -0.046 0.032 0.090 0.056 
$50 0.098** 0.044 0.068 0.058 
$100 0.202*** 0.047 -0.046 0.070 
      
ATTITUDE VARIABES         
Privacy      
Privacy is important to me -0.002 0.023 -0.052 0.043 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.062** 0.032 0.098** 0.039 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.053* 0.031 0.034 0.044 
      
Technology use      
I like to have the latest technology 0.016 0.033 -0.006 0.049 
I find new technologies easy to use 0.059** 0.030 -0.071* 0.041 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth -0.010 0.025 0.002 0.036 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 0.011 0.029 -0.029 0.039 
      
Farm management      
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 0.024 0.037 -0.072 0.050 
I am proactive in seeking advice -0.012 0.035 0.038 0.050 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 0.007 0.029 0.008 0.038 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.062** 0.031 0.050 0.048 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
Number of observations: 2,643 
Log-pseudolikelihood: -1513.77 
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Table A1.8: Marginal Effects for Quartile Analysis; Random Effects Probit 
 
Quartile 1 Diff. between Q1 and Q4 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Std. 
Err. 
CHOICE VARIABLES         
Organization (base = government)     
University Researchers 0.335*** 0.047 -0.035 0.065 
Crop Input Suppliers 0.229*** 0.048 -0.032 0.068 
Equipment Manufacturers 0.034 0.044 0.019 0.078 
Grower Associations 0.206*** 0.045 -0.034 0.064 
Financial Institutions 0.060 0.040 0.007 0.072 
      
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)     
Benchmarks 0.121*** 0.030 0.008 0.044 
Prescription Maps 0.078*** 0.029 0.05 0.045 
      
Financial Incentive (base = $0)     
-$50 -0.039 0.033 0.064 0.057 
$50 0.116*** 0.042 0.084 0.059 
$100 0.237*** 0.047 -0.036 0.057 
      
ATTITUDE VARIABES         
Privacy      
Privacy is important to me -0.005 0.027 -0.068 0.049 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm -0.082** 0.036 0.126*** 0.048 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm 0.053 0.037 0.059 0.049 
      
Technology use      
I like to have the latest technology 0.025 0.034 -0.006 0.057 
I find new technologies easy to use 0.058 0.037 -0.08 0.051 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth -0.025 0.032 0.007 0.047 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 0.008 0.034 -0.042 0.044 
      
Farm management      
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended 0.039 0.044 -0.103* 0.059 
I am proactive in seeking advice 0.007 0.041 0.042 0.066 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years 0.006 0.035 0.013 0.047 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm -0.073** 0.037 0.055 0.055 
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1% 
Number of observations: 2,643 
Log-pseudolikelihood: -1276.68 
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Table A1.9: Latent class logit coefficients, no variables in the membership equation (𝒁𝟏𝒊) 
 
Table A1.10: Latent class overall partial effects, no variables in the membership equation (𝒁𝟏𝒊) 
  
Class probabilities
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -6.65*** 1.24 -2.37*** 0.189 -1.04*** 0.286
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 3.15*** 1.19 2.04*** 0.180 1.51*** 0.330
Crop Input Suppliers 3.03** 1.19 1.18*** 0.178 1.61*** 0.332
Equipment Manufacturers -25.2 353856 0.487** 0.190 1.08*** 0.317
Grower Associations 2.60** 1.22 1.15*** 0.178 1.28*** 0.327
Financial Institutions 1.76 1.29 0.339* 0.188 0.752** 0.300
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.674 0.419 1.00*** 0.121 0.778*** 0.228
Prescription Maps 1.14*** 0.400 0.692*** 0.121 0.503** 0.217
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.039 0.509 0.022 0.146 0.288 0.222
$50 0.853* 0.461 0.628*** 0.144 2.64*** 0.518
$100 1.03** 0.452 1.18*** 0.146 1.97*** 0.318
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Log-likelihood: -2588.20
32% 47% 21%
Class1 Class 2 Class 3
Partial 
Effect Elasticity
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 0.167*** 0.351
Crop Input Suppliers 0.136*** 0.286
Equipment Manufacturers -0.557 -1.17
Grower Associations 0.120*** 0.253
Financial Institutions 0.064** 0.135
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.062*** 0.262
Prescription Maps 0.058*** 0.244
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.006 0.019
$50 0.082*** 0.257
$100 0.094*** 0.299
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
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Table A1.11: Latent class logit coefficients, attitude statements in the membership equation (𝒁𝟑𝒊) 
 
  
Class probabilities
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -6.76*** 1.223 -0.954*** 0.319 -2.27*** 0.199
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 3.39*** 1.15 1.46*** 0.352 2.00*** 0.183
Crop Input Suppliers 3.01** 1.18 1.53*** 0.352 1.22*** 0.176
Equipment Manufacturers 1.23 1.29 1.04*** 0.344 0.476** 0.189
Grower Associations 2.43** 1.19 1.22*** 0.340 1.21*** 0.175
Financial Institutions 2.13* 1.21 0.743** 0.315 0.302 0.187
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.873** 0.390 0.803*** 0.242 0.980*** 0.122
Prescription Maps 1.19*** 0.371 0.474** 0.227 0.672*** 0.120
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.170 0.436 0.341 0.246 -0.003 0.146
$50 0.916** 0.397 2.92*** 0.641 0.637*** 0.149
$100 1.11*** 0.401 2.01*** 0.331 1.19*** 0.149
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Log-likelihood: -2552.04
32% 19% 49%
Class 3Class 2Class1
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Table A1.12: Coefficients impacting class membership, attitude statements in the membership equation 
(𝒁𝟑𝒊), base = class 3 
 
Table A1.13: Latent class overall partial effects, attitude statements in the membership equation (𝒁𝟑𝒊) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.208 1.09 -1.10 1.28
Privacy 
Privacy is important to me 0.020 0.153 -0.123 0.167
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm 0.147 0.143 -0.139 0.157
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm -0.595*** 0.166 0.046 0.198
Technology use 
I like to have the latest technology -0.031 0.174 -0.085 0.199
I find new technologies easy to use -0.164 0.156 -0.192 0.180
New technology is more hassle than it is worth 0.288** 0.135 -0.072 0.160
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm 0.425*** 0.147 0.432** 0.175
Farm management 
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended -0.280 0.185 -0.054 0.215
I am proactive in seeking advice -0.114 0.181 -0.045 0.216
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years -0.010 20.7 0.243 27.9
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm 0.229 63.4 0.003 76.6
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Class 1 Class 2
Partial 
Effect Elasticity
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 0.464*** 0.285
Crop Input Suppliers 0.367*** 0.225
Equipment Manufacturers 0.163** 0.100
Grower Associations 0.317*** 0.195
Financial Institutions 0.193** 0.118
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.181*** 0.222
Prescription Maps 0.158*** 0.194
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.023 0.021
$50 0.228*** 0.210
$100 0.260*** 0.240
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
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Table A1.14: Latent class logit coefficients, technology use variables in the membership equation (𝒁𝟒𝒊) 
 
  
Class probabilities
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -6.45*** 1.26 -1.00*** 0.339 -2.26*** 0.196
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 3.18*** 1.18 1.44*** 0.381 2.03*** 0.181
Crop Input Suppliers 2.89** 1.21 1.60*** 0.376 1.21*** 0.179
Equipment Manufacturers -0.074 3.01 0.898*** 0.340 0.570*** 0.183
Grower Associations 2.52** 1.22 1.35*** 0.365 1.15*** 0.177
Financial Institutions 1.69 1.25 0.627** 0.319 0.401** 0.181
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.716* 0.387 0.842*** 0.256 0.971*** 0.120
Prescription Maps 1.09*** 0.352 0.514** 0.230 0.665*** 0.120
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.142 0.436 0.501** 0.252 -0.069 0.143
$50 0.873** 0.400 2.93*** 0.687 0.628*** 0.157
$100 1.02** 0.415 2.06*** 0.333 1.17*** 0.151
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Log-likelihood: -2568.62
29% 19% 52%
Class1 Class 2 Class 3
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Table A1.15: Coefficients impacting class membership, technology use variables in the membership 
equation (𝒁𝟒𝒊), base = class 3 
  
  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept -0.178 0.680 -1.90* 1.106
Yield Monitors 
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.335 0.369 0.075 0.522
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.532 0.353 0.779* 0.472
GPS Guidance 
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.071 0.637 0.556 0.994
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 1.150 0.977 0.914 1.278
Soil Sampling 
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.334 0.326 0.635 0.487
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.017 0.492 0.608 0.689
Variable rate technology 
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance 0.257 0.333 0.640 0.433
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance 0.911* 0.524 0.040 0.751
Automatic Section Control 
I use this technology and it improves my farm’s performance -0.078 0.287 -1.04*** 0.355
I use this technology but it doesn’t improve my farm’s performance -29.9*** 9.72 -0.167 12.2
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
Class 1 Class 2
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Table A1.16: Latent class overall partial effects, technology use in the membership equation (𝒁𝟒𝒊) 
 
  
Partial 
Effect Elasticity
Organization (base = government)
University Researchers 0.461*** 0.267
Crop Input Suppliers 0.362*** 0.210
Equipment Manufacturers 0.091 0.053
Grower Associations 0.324*** 0.189
Financial Institutions 0.167** 0.097
Non-Financial Incentive (base = none)
Benchmarks 0.179*** 0.208
Prescription Maps 0.155*** 0.180
Financial Incentive (base = $0)
-$50 0.021 0.018
$50 0.232*** 0.203
$100 0.265*** 0.231
Significance codes: ‘*’ 10%, ‘**’ 5%, ‘***’ 1%
Number of observations: 5265
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APPENDIX 2: Model Choice and Construction 
Heteroscedastic Probit 
  In a heteroscedastic probit model, the variance is free to vary with a set of variables. This 
is contrary to a probit model where variance is fixed at one. The variables that variance moves 
with are contained in Z, and may or may not bee a subset of X. The probability of success (the 
probability that the farmer will participate in a big data program) for the ith observation is: 
Pr(𝑦௜ = 1|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜) = Φ ൜
𝑥௜𝑏
exp (𝑧௜𝛾)
ൠ, 
where  𝑦௜ = 1 if the respondent chooses to participate in the big data program, 
𝑥௜  is a vector of variables that impact 𝑦௜,  
 𝑧௜ is a vector of variables that impact the variance, and 
 𝑏, 𝛾 are coefficient vectors. 
 
The probability of failure is Pr(𝑦௜ = 0|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜) = 1 − Pr(𝑦௜ = 1|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜). Given this, the 
density for each observation is: 
𝑓(𝑦௜|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜) = Pr(𝑦௜ = 1|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜)௬೔ ∗ Pr(𝑦௜ = 0|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜)ଵି௬೔ 
𝑓(𝑦௜|𝑥௜ , 𝑧௜) = ൤Φ ൜
𝑥௜𝑏
exp (𝑧௜𝛾)
ൠ൨
௬೔
∗ ൤1 − Φ ൜
𝑥௜𝑏
exp (𝑧௜𝛾)
ൠ൨
ଵି௬೔
 
Multiplying the density for each function and taking the natural logarithm gives the log-
likelihood function: 
𝐿(𝛽, Γ) = ෍ ൜𝑦௜ ∗ 𝑙𝑛 ൤Φ ൜
𝑥௜𝛽
exp(𝑧௜Γ)
ൠ൨ + (1 − 𝑦௜) ∗ 𝑙𝑛 ൤1 − Φ ൜
𝑥௜𝛽
exp (𝑧௜Γ)
ൠ൨ൠ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Optimizing the log-likelihood with respect to β and Γ gives their maximum likelihood 
estimates, 𝑏 and 𝛾. Standard errors are clustered on respondent (each respondent accounts for 
approximately 12 observations). 
 To determine the variables that influence variance (Z), we performed a Breusch-Pagan test. 
We obtained the squared residuals from a probit model with all explanatory variables (X) included 
and regressed them on the explanatory variables (X). In the resulting output, the variables that 
emerged as statistically significant at the 10% level were determined to impact the variance. These 
variables were chosen to make up Z. These variables were organization, financial incentive, non-
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financial incentive, ‘Privacy is important to me’, ‘I would be put at a disadvantage if others could 
access info about my farm’, ‘I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm’, ‘I know better 
than others how to manage risk on my farm’, farm revenue, and the incentive provided to 
respondents for completing the survey.  
 
Random Effects Probit  
The second model used is a random effects probit model. A traditional random effects model uses 
generalized least squares (GLS) to generate estimates, however, the random effects probit model 
uses maximum likelihood. This is because maximum likelihood is required for the ‘probit’ part of 
the analysis. Observations are grouped by respondent (or by panel). The panel-level likelihood 
function is,  
𝑙௜ = න
𝑒ି௩೔
మ ଶఙೡమൗ
√2𝜋𝜎௩
ஶ
ିஶ
ቐෑ 𝐹(𝑦௜௤ , 𝑥௜௤𝛽 + 𝑣௜)
௡೔
௤ୀଵ
ቑ 𝑑𝑣௜ 
where: 
𝐹൫𝑦௜௤ , 𝑥௜௤𝛽 + 𝑣௜൯ = ൜
Φ(𝑥௜௤𝛽 + 𝑣௜)   𝑖𝑓   𝑦 = 1
1 − Φ(𝑥௜௤𝛽 + 𝑣௜)   𝑖𝑓    𝑦 = 0
 
and: 𝑣௜ is the random effect, 
i is an index for individual, 
q is an index for question number, 
𝑛௜ is the number of responses for the ith individual, and 
Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. 
The log-likelihood function is the sum of the logs of the panel-level likelihoods. 
Maximizing the log-likelihood function gives the estimates for 𝛽 and 𝜎௩. The random effects probit 
model analyzes variation between individuals (between variation) and variation between 
observations from the same individual (within variation).  
 
Factor Analysis 
The attitude variables are analyzed using factor analysis. Factor analysis can be useful 
where there is correlation between a set of variables included in a model. Factor analysis attempts 
to condense the overall variation in a set of variables into one measure. It is appropriate for the 
attitude statements because there are multiple statements attempting to capture the same measure. 
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The first three statements are attempting to capture privacy attitudes, the next four are capturing 
technology use attitudes, and the final four are capturing farm management attitudes. Because they 
are capturing the same thing, high correlation between variables in the same category is expected. 
The correlation matrix for the eleven attitude variables is shown in table A2.1.. High numbers are 
expected within the boxes and low numbers are expected outside the boxes. This is generally true, 
however there are some high correlations between statements measure technology use attitudes 
and farm management attitudes, suggesting these measures may be confounded.  
 
Table A2.1: Correlation matrix for attitude variables 
  Privacy Technology Use Farm Management 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Pr
iv
ac
y 1 1.00           
2 0.36 1.00          
3 -0.24 -0.37 1.00         
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
U
se
 
4 0.11 0.13 0.07 1.00        
5 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.34 1.00       
6 0.03 0.10 -0.05 -0.27 -0.12 1.00      
7 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.34 0.30 -0.08 1.00     
Fa
rm
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 8 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.48 0.30 -0.13 0.28 1.00    
9 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.39 0.40 -0.16 0.28 0.38 1.00   
10 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.17 -0.20 0.13 0.19 0.27 1.00  
11 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.11 1.00 
 
 
Factor analysis takes the total variation from a set of variables that are correlated and breaks 
it up into an equal number of orthogonal factors that are used in place of the variables in the 
analysis. The first factor captures the most possible total variation in the variables examined. The 
second factor captures the most possible total variation that remains unexplained by the first factor. 
This process continues until the total variation in the variables examined is captured by the factors. 
As successive factors become less important, they can be excluded from the analysis. I perform 
factor analysis on each group of attitude variables. The goal of this analysis is to synthesize the 
responses from the statements in each category of the attitude variables, so the final model has one 
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measure of privacy attitudes, one measure of attitudes towards technology, and one measure of 
farm management attitudes.  
The decision rule on the number of factors to include in the analysis depends on the 
percentage of variation each factor captures. Any factor that captures more than its fair share of 
variation should be included. The fair share of variation for each factor is the amount of variation 
it would capture if the total variation was equally divided among all factors. The proportion of 
variation explained by each factor is shown in table A2.2. Only one factor from each group 
captured more than its fair share of variation, so only one factor for each group is included in the 
models. There is one measure of privacy attitudes, one measure of technology use attitudes, and 
one measure of farm management attitudes.  
 
Table A2.2: Proportion of variation explained by generated factors 
Privacy  
(fair share = 33.3%) 
Technology Use 
(fair share = 25%) 
Farm Management 
(fair share = 25%) 
Factor 
Percent 
variation 
explained 
Factor 
Percent 
variation 
explained 
Factor 
Percent 
variation 
explained 
1 55% 1 44% 1 41% 
2 25% 2 24% 2 23% 
3 20% 3 18% 3 21% 
    4 15% 4 15% 
 
Each factor has a related eigenvector where each value in the vector corresponds to a 
variable analyzed. This eigenvector describes the composition of the factor. Table A2.3 shows the 
eigenvectors associated with the first factor for privacy attitudes, attitudes towards technology use, 
and farm management attitudes. From these values we can determine the relationship between the 
variables and the factors. The signs of the values in the eigenvectors line up with expectations 
except for the last statement in farm management attitudes.  
The factor describing privacy preferences increases with increasing strictness in privacy 
preferences. The factor describing attitudes towards technology increases with more favourable 
attitudes towards technology. The factor describing farm management attitudes increases with 
increasing progressiveness in farm management style. The results from factor analysis can be 
difficult to interpret, however broad interpretations regarding effect direction can be made. 
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Table A2.3: Eigenvectors for first factor for each group 
Privacy  
Expected 
Sign Eigenvector 
Privacy is important to me + 0.55 
I would be put at a disadvantage if other could access info about my farm + 0.62 
I feel comfortable sharing information about my farm - -0.56 
     
Technology Use    
I like to have the latest technology + 0.59 
I find new technologies easy to use + 0.51 
New technology is more hassle than it is worth - -0.34 
I am getting maximum use out of available tech on my farm + 0.51 
     
Farm Management    
I have implemented new techniques that have been recommended + 0.55 
I am proactive in seeking advice + 0.60 
Precision ag will transform agriculture over the next 20 years + 0.46 
I know better than others how to manage risk on my farm - 0.34 
 
Latent Class Model Selection 
Two latent class models are constructed. One includes two latent classes and on includes three latent 
classes. To determine which model fits the data better, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are used. They are calculated as, 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2𝐿𝐿 + 2𝑚              and               𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2𝐿𝐿 + 𝑚 ∗ ln (𝑛), 
where:  
LL is the log-likelihood, 
 m is the number of parameters calculated, and  
 n is the number of observations.  
 
The last term in each expression is the penalty component serving to discourage 
overfitting of a model. The model with the lower AIC or BIC is preferred. Both measures 
conclude that the optimal number of classes for the latent class analysis is two.   
 
